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ABSTRACT 
     Two experiments were designed to explore the existence of systematic differences in risk 
perceptions and risk attitudes between Chinese and U.S. participants. The first experiment 
involved ranking monetary lotteries using measures of perceived riskiness and WTP. Several 
simple heuristics were evaluated to predict perceived riskiness and WTP. Using WTP 
responses, cumulative prospect theory functions were determined for participants from both 
countries. Compared to their U.S. counterparts, Chinese participants are found to be less risk 
averse and to have higher within group agreement for each task. The second experiment 
involved ranking real-world risks and associated risk-mitigation programs using measures of 
concern and preference, respectively. Conjoint analysis reveals additional cultural differences 
in the perception and evaluation of multi-attribute risks and risk-mitigation programs. The 
cross-cultural versus cross-task variation are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Because of economic globalization and an awareness that ecological problems span the 
world, countries have to negotiate and coordinate on risk-mitigation planning. For example, 
international cooperation is called for fighting against natural disasters (e.g., Bruce, 1999; 
Gürer, 1998), pollution (e.g., Wilkening, 2001; Lai, 2001), and terrorism (e.g., Dibb, 2002). 
Understanding how people with different cultural backgrounds perceive risks is a critical 
research with direct policy implications. To date, most studies on risk perception and risk 
preference have included only North American and European participants (e.g., Englander et 
al., 1986; Holtgrave & Weber, 1993; Johnson & Tversky, 1984; Krewski, et al., 1995; Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980; Slovic, et al., 1996). Studies using Asian participants are 
relatively scarce (Rorhmann, 1999). The extent to which results from the western studies can 
be generalized to Asian cultures is open to question. 
This paper reports two experiments designed to explore cultural differences in risk 
attitudes and risk perception. Two streams of cross-cultural risk studies are relevant to the 
current study. The first is about monetary risks. Typically multi-outcome lotteries are used to 
test the prediction power of various models. For example, Weber and Hsee et al. conducted 
several studies on cross-cultural differences in risk judgment and risk preferences (Weber & 
Hsee, 1998; Bontempo, Bottom, & Weber, 1997; Hsee & Weber, 1999). They found that 
Chinese respondents were less risk-averse based on the risk-attitude definition found in 
traditional expected utility theory. The second stream of studies follows the psychometric 
framework established by Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, and Combs (1978), who 
suggested more dimensions may be relevant to the concept of risk in people’s mind. Factor 
analyses are commonly used to discern the underlying cognitive structures of perceived risk. 
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For example, Zhang (1994), Xie (1995), and Xie, Wang & Xu (2003) investigated the 
structure of risk concepts across specific environmental, safety, and societal hazards. 
However, it is difficult to compare their results directly with Anglo-European studies, because 
only Chinese participants were recruited, modified response scales were used, and few 
detailed analyses were reported. 
Our approach differs from the above studies in that conjoint designs are used for all tasks: 
this enables us to check the importance of each dimension in the evaluation of lotteries, 
hypothetical risks, as well as hypothetical risk-mitigation programs. Conjoint analysis is a 
method frequently used in marketing science, which helps to reveal the relative importance of 
different attributes when choosing multi-attribute products. Although hypothetical stimuli 
have been criticized for the lack of external validity, the conjoint design in this study 
encourage explicit trade-offs that are essential to many decision (Payne, Bettman, & Sckade, 
1999). 
The first experiment involves ranking and pricing multi-outcome lotteries. The second 
experiment extends the study to more general multi-attribute risks and risk-mitigation 
programs. We have two purposes in this study: 
(1) The use of multiple tasks and subject populations with different cultural backgrounds 
make it possible to examine both cross-cultural variation and cross-task variation. Although 
culture could play a role in people’s risk preference, it is also argued that individuals actually 
“construct” their preferences, which means preferences are largely depend on the 
characteristics of the objects that are evaluated (Fischhoff, 1991). The present study seeks 
evidences to support this latter view. 
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(2) The WTP data in the first experiment also allowed us to fit cumulative prospect theory 
(CPT) models at individual level. Though CPT is the best-accepted alternative theory to 
expected utility (EU) theory, the shape of value (or utility) function is still on debate. For 
example, although the well-known S-shaped value function has received empirical evidence, 
the reverse S-shaped utility function suggested by Markowitz (1952) is also supported by 
some investigations (Levy & Levy, 2002). Moreover, the value or utility function in loss 
domain is more controversial than in gains (Fennema & Assen, 1999). Therefore, when fitting 
CPT function in this paper, we includes more relaxed forms of value function that are not 
restricted to the standard S-shape, but allow concavity or convexity in either gains or losses. 
In addition, we design mixed-outcome lotteries as stimuli for the first experiment because the 
typical use of pure positive or negative in previous studies has been criticized as not realistic 
enough and subject to the bias of “certainty effects” (Levy & Levy, 2002). 
 
EXPERIMENT 1: EVALUATING MULTI-OUTCOME LOTTERIES 
The objective of the first experiment is to model risk perceptions and attitudes towards 
multi-outcome lotteries. Specifically, the predictive power of several simple decision 
heuristics are tested, the relative importance of mean, variance, and probability of loss are 
examined, and parameter values of value function and probability weighting functions are fit 
for each individual. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
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In both U.S. and China, university students were recruited from psychology and economic 
classes, using an electronic bulletin board announcement. Participants in the study were 35 
U.S. students, (20 women and 15 men, aged 18 to 40), and 37 Chinese students (17 women 
and 20 men, aged 21 to 32). 
Design and Tasks 
Participants were given two groups of three-outcome lotteries sequentially. The tasks 
involved ranking the riskiness of lotteries within each lottery group and giving a WTP for 
each lottery. WTP was allowed to be negative if the participant judged the lottery as 
unattractive, at which case the negative WTP is equivalent to Willingness To Accept (WTA). 
By design, we manipulated three attributes of the lotteries: (1) four levels of expected value 
(EV — −$10, −1, $1, $10); (2) two levels of standard deviation (SD — 15, 40), and (3) two 
levels of probability of negative outcomes (P(−) —  0.30, 0.70), resulting a 4×2×2  design and 
16 lotteries. See Table 1 for the design of all lotteries. These lotteries were divided into two 
groups based on their expected value, with each group containing eight lotteries. The EV of 
one task was positive ($1 and $10), while the EV of the other task was negative (−$1 and 
−$10). Each lottery was displayed on a card to facilitate ranking. The orders of two tasks were 
alternated to avoid order effects. 
_________________________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
_________________________________________ 
 
Back-translation methods (Brislin, 1986) were used to create the Chinese version of the 
materials. The questionnaire, originally written in English, was translated into Chinese by one 
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of the authors. Then, a different bilingual translated the instruments back into English. The 
two English versions were compared and discrepant passages rewritten. Monetary lottery 
outcomes were calibrated based on estimates of monthly living expenses of college students 
in the U.S. and China1.  
Every participant received a large envelope that included a cover letter and four smaller 
envelopes labeled 1-4. The first two tasks were the lottery tasks in the first experiment. The 
last two tasks were ranking tasks for risks and risk-mitigation programs in the second 
experiment, which are described later. In each small envelope, there were eight cards, a 
description of the specific task, and a set of questions. The participants were asked to open the 
big envelope, read the cover letter, and complete the four tasks in sequence. The four tasks 
took a total of 20-45 minutes to complete. 
 
Simple Heuristics 
When faced with uncertain choices, individuals can use simple heuristics rather than 
considering the entire probability distribution of outcomes (Boussard & Patit, 1967; Alderfer 
& Bierman, 1970). For example, when choosing between monetary lotteries, some individuals 
can focus on (a) the probability of loss, denoted as P(−) (Bontempo et al., 1997; Alderfer & 
Bierman, 1970); (b) the minimum outcome, denoted as MIN  (Lopes,1987; Weber & Hsee 
1998; Alderfer & Bierman, 1970); (c) the maximum outcome, denoted as MAX (Lopes, 1987; 
Bontempo et. al., 1997); or (d) the spread calculated as maximum outcome minus minimum 
                                                 
1 One Dollar ($) in English version of questionnaire is converted to one Yuan  (Chinese currency) in Chinese 
version because it is estimated that the monthly expense is about $500~$800 for a student in the U.S., and about 
500~800 Yuan for a student in China.   
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outcome, denoted as MAX−MIN (Ranyard, 1998). Other heuristics are also possible.2 Using 
the data collected from our first experiment and the published results from Bontempo et al. 
(1997) and Weber & Hsee (1998), we evaluated how well these four simple heuristics and one 
algorithm (EV) performed in predicting how individuals ranked multi-outcome lotteries in 
terms of perceived riskiness and WTP at the aggregate level.  
 
Fitting CPT  
A CPT model (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) was fit for each participant. We assume that 
(1) individuals had consistent value functions that could be modeled using their reported 
WTPs; (2) they could have different value functions for losses and gains (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979); and (3) the value functions had the following functional form: 
⎩⎨
⎧
<−−
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0
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where α and β are risk-aversion coefficients for gains and losses respectively; and λ is the 
loss-aversion coefficient.3 For each lottery, the three outcomes were ranked from worst to 
best, x-m< …< 0 <…<xn. The weighting function for gains is:  
 
π+(pi)=w+(pi+…+pn)− w+(pi+1+…+pn)  (2) 
                                                 
2 We also evaluated three other heuristics: (1) the sum of gains, SUM(+); (2) the sum of losses, SUM(-); (3) the 
probability of gains, P(+). In our tasks, SUM(+) and SUM(-) were highly correlated with MAX and MIN, 
respectively, and P(+) was equivalent to P(-). We do not discuss these heuristics further.  
3 Because the loss aversion coefficient λ was found to be insensitive insensitive to the results in our data, and did 
not improve the model fitting (i.e., adding λ into the model did not reduce the RMSD), we hold this value to 1. 
Similar practices with λ can also be found in Lopes & Oden (1999) and Bernstein, et al. (1997). 
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The value of the lottery is represented as . Using the Solver tool in 
Excel, the 4-parameter CPT model was fit by minimizing the RMSD (rooted-mean-squared-
deviation) between predicted WTP and actual WTP for each individual participant. 
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Results and Discussion 
Differences on pricing of lotteries 
Main effects of both nationalities (F(1,1134)=12.5, p<0.001) and lotteries 
(F(15,1120)=4.93, p<0.001) were found, but no interaction effect between nationalities and 
lotteries existed. The mean price offered by Chinese was −$5, which was higher that the mean 
price of −$18 offered by the U.S. participants. Since the average WTP from both cultures are 
lower than the average expected value of lotteries listed in Table 1, the average participants 
from both cultures could classified as risk-averse based on the traditional expected-utility 
definition of risk-attitudes. Consistent with other previous studies (e.g., Weber & Hsee, 
1998),  Chinese participants seemed to be less risk-averse than the U.S. participants. 
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Simple heuristics 
To test the prediction power of simple heuristics, correlation analyses were performed at 
the aggregate levels for the current study, and for the published data of the studies by 
Bontempo et al. (1997) and Weber & Hsee (1998). Table 2 presents the results of correlation 
and significance tests for all studies. For each nationality, the lotteries from the two studies 
were ranked using the average stated riskiness ratings, denoted as Rank(riskiness). The lottery 
with the lowest average stated riskiness rate was ranked first. These ranks were then 
compared to the ranks generated by sorting the lotteries based on each heuristic, denoted as 
Rank(heuristics).The lowest value was ranked first. We also compared the average value of 
WTP and the value based on each heuristic. The prediction power of each heuristic is 
summarized below. 
 
_________________________________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
_________________________________________ 
 
EV  (mean value) ⎯ The fourth column in Table 2 shows that except for Weber & Hsee 
(1998)’s results of perceived riskiness, ranks of EV were negatively correlated with ranks of 
riskiness, and EV was positively correlated with WTP. These results were in the same 
direction as one would expect, higher EV implying lower risk and higher value. The reason 
for the unexpected patterns in Weber & Hsee (1998)’s results is probably because in their 
lottery designs: EV was positively correlated with the variance of lottery, which was 
associated with perceived riskiness.  
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MAX orMIN  (best or worst payoff) ⎯ As shown in Table 2, MAX was not a consistent 
predictor for perceived riskiness, but was significantly correlated with WTP as expected, 
indicating the best outcome is important when pricing the lotteries, whereas it plays a less 
important role when judging riskiness.  In almost all studies, ranks of MIN were correlated 
with ranks of perceived riskiness, implying worst outcome is a better predictor for riskiness 
judgments.  MIN was also highly correlated with WTP in current study. The unexpected 
positive correlation of MIN and WTP in Weber & Hsee (1998)’s study may still be explained 
by their lottery designs ⎯ EV was negatively related to MIN in their lotteries, resulting in a 
negative correlation between MIN and WTP.  
MAX−MIN  (range of payoffs) ⎯ In all studies, ranks of (MAX−MIN) were correlated 
with Rank(riskiness) as expected, i.e., larger range of outcomes implying higher risk. The 
correlation between Rank(MAX−MIN) and Rank(riskiness) in Weber & Hsee  (1998) is 
somewhat higher for Chinese participants (p=0.10), but this difference is not replicated in 
other studies. Regarding the pricing of lotteries, WTP is negatively correlated with MAX-
MIN in the current study, indicating risk-averse attitudes. The positive correlation of 
MAX−MIN and WTP in studies by Weber & Hsee (1998) is perhaps again caused by the 
correlation of EV and variance in their lottery designs.  
P(−)  (probability of loss) ⎯ P(−) seemed to be an unstable predictor for perceived 
riskiness and pricing of lotteries. In the current study, it conflicted with what one can expect 
⎯ higher probabilities of loss were actually associated with lower perceived riskiness and 
higher prices. A further look at lottery designs in the present study indicated a negative 
correlation between P(−)  and MIN, which may explain the unexpected pattern of correlation. 
In the current study, it seemed that the information of probability was largely neglected by 
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participants or dominated by the magnitude of potential loss. In previous studies by Bentempo 
et al. (1997) and Hsee & Weber (1998), ranks of P(−)  were positively related to ranks of 
riskiness as expected. This correlation was significantly higher for the U.S. participants in the 
study by Hsee & Weber (1998) (p<0.05), which was in the line with the previous findings that 
Chinese subjects were less accurate in probability calibrations (Wright et al., 1983). Similar 
difference emerged in Bentempo et al. (1997). 
Although across-person tests can cause aggregate errors (Nickerson and McClelland, 
1989), the above correlation analyses serves as a starting point to link the three studies. It 
provides evidence of relatively robust prediction powers for some heuristics, and rather 
inconsistent performance of other heuristics. The different impacts of heuristics in risk 
judgment and pricing tasks support previous studies on preference reversal, which suggest 
that individuals tend to offer higher price for $ bet (low-probability, high payoffs), but choose 
P-bet (high probability, low payoffs), because the attention shifts as the response modes 
change (Tversky, Slovic & Kahneman, 1990). Because lotteries can be conceived as 
multidimensional stimuli, it is found that pricing is more highly correlated with payoffs of the 
lotteries, whereas rating or choice are more highly correlated with the probability involved 
(Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968). An asymmetric preference reversal between riskiness rating 
and choice was found in a study on hazard risk decisions (Kuhn and Budescu, 1996), with 
many subjects choosing an option of in a pair that they rated as more risky. It is found that 
subjects’ preference of options was consistent with expected value, even though this 
information was not provided in the stimuli; on the other hand, the ratings of riskiness were 
quite consistent with expected loss. Our results suggest the magnitude of loss (MIN) and the 
range of outcomes (MAX-MIN) are more important in risk judgments, whereas the 
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magnitudes of gain/loss (MAX or MIN) are more important in pricing lotteries. Comparing 
our results to the studies by Weber and Hsee (1998), it appears that more attention shifts to 
the downside of payoffs when negative outcomes are involved in the lotteries, and when 
negative WTP or Willingness To Accept (WTA) are allowed.  
The only significant cultural difference in the heuristics analysis was the correlation 
between ranks of P(−) and ranks of riskiness in the results by Hsee & Weber (1998). But 
generally speaking, the cross-task differences seemed to be stronger than cross-cultural 
within-task differences for most heuristics.  
 
Conjoint Analysis on EV, SD, and P(−)  
Because we used a 4×2×2 experimental design for EV, SD, and P(−) , we were able to 
analyze the relative importance of each dimension, using a conjoint analysis approach (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1992). For example, to evaluate the importance of P(−)  for each 
participant, we calculated the differences in the sum of ranks of lotteries with high level of 
P(−) with the sum of ranks with low level of P(−). Then, we compared the average difference 
scores for all U.S. participants and Chinese participants for all of the attributes (i.e., EV, SD, 
and P(−)). 
Table 3 presents the results of the conjoint analysis for all lottery tasks. EV was 
significant in both riskiness ranking and WTP assessments tasks for both nationalities, but 
was more important to Chinese participants in the riskiness ranking tasks (p < 0.05). The SD 
of the lotteries was important to both nationalities when ranking riskiness. P(−) was 
significant but opposite to expected direction for most tasks. As discussed before in our 
heuristic analysis, P(−) was not a straightforward predictor for risk judgment and pricing. It is 
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not clear whether this is because people overestimate the small probability of relatively large 
loss or gains (Tversky & Kahenamann, 1992) or because they totally ignored the probability 
dimension. No cultural differences were found for SD and P(−). 
 
_________________________________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
_________________________________________ 
 
Fitting CPT  
The cumulative distributions of the two estimated parameters in value function are shown 
in Figure 1. In the gain domain, the median value of risk coefficient α was 0.79 for the U.S. 
sample and 0.80 for Chinese sample. The median value of risk coefficient β was 0.99 for the 
Chinese sample and 1.64 for U.S. sample. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the distributions of 
estimated parameters were not significantly different in the gain domain for the two national 
samples, but in losses, the U.S. sample was more risk-averse (p<0.01). 
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distributions of the weighting function parameter for both 
countries in gains and losses. The median value of the gain parameter (γ) was 0.39 for the 
U.S. sample and 0.54 for the Chinese sample, whereas the median value of the parameter in 
loss (δ) was 0.45 for the U.S. sample and 0.46 for the Chinese sample. The left panel in 
Figure 2 indicates that the U.S. sample tended to have smaller values in the weighting 
function in gain, while the right panel shows little difference between the two countries. In 
other words, the weighting function for U.S. sample seemed to be more curved in gains, but 
the two nationalities were similar in weighting probabilities of losses. 
 
 16
_________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
_________________________________________ 
_________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
_________________________________________ 
 
Figure 3 plots α and β for each subject ⎯ the closer the value is to 1, the more risk 
neutral the individual. Figure 3 shows that the majority of participants demonstrated risk 
preferences that were either (1) risk-averse in gains and risk-averse in losses; or (2) risk-
averse in gains and risk-seeking in losses.  The first pattern is actually implied by the 
traditional universal concave utility function. The second pattern is consistent with the S-
shape value function in prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1992). The consistent risk-
averse attitudes in gains and more diverse risk-attitude in losses are also supported by 
previous research in framing effects (Schneider, 1992). 
 
_________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
_________________________________________ 
In summary, the first experiment reveals some cross-cultural differences in heuristics and 
risk-attitudes for mixed-outcome lotteries. In the next section we will focus on the cultural-
differences in evaluation of multi-attribute risks and risk-mitigation programs. 
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EXPERIMENT 2: EVALUATING MULTI-ATTRIBUTE RISKS AND RISK-
MITIGAITON PROGRAMS 
 
The first experiment focused only on monetary risks as presented in lotteries. In everyday 
life, however, people face a variety of risks that have more attributes than single-attribute 
monetary lotteries. In the original work by Fischhoff et al. (1978), nine qualitative 
psychometric risk variables were listed. In extended studies (Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1980; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1985), they found that perceived and 
acceptable risks were predictable by risk variables and underlying factors. Since 1978, 
numerous risk-perception studies have demonstrated that people consider a variety of risk 
attributes. For example, based on an extensive reanalysis, of Fischhoff et al. (1978), Jenni 
(1997) suggested that appropriate attributes should include voluntariness, immediacy, 
controllability, severity, personal or societal exposure, equity, and impacts on future 
generations, as well as outcome uncertainty measures, such as newness, knowledge, or 
catastrophic potential. 
Furthermore, policymakers are interested in people's opinions about risks. Because risks 
are complex, the lay public can benefit from information materials that represent risks in a 
relatively straightforward and consistent manner (Morgan, et al. 1996). Risk rankings by lay 
people can help governments make risk-management decisions (Florig, et al. 2001; Morgan, 
et al. 2001; Fischbeck et al. 2000); however, it is not enough because risk rankings are not 
always consistent with the demand of risk mitigation, and for each risk, many strategies can 
be used for risk mitigation. Policy makers have to allocate limited resources and choose the 
optimal risk-mitigation programs. Therefore, public attitudes towards risk-mitigation 
priorities are important inputs for policy-making processes (Morgan et al., 1996). As an 
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extension of previous studies, we designed the second experiment to explore the cross-
cultural differences in multi-attribute risk judgment and evaluation of risk-mitigation 
programs. 
 
Methods 
Participants  
The participants were the same as in the first experiment.  
Design and Tasks 
Starting with a conjoint design, a multi-attribute procedure was used to explore the 
relative importance of different dimensions in people’s perceptions of health, safety, and 
other everyday risks. Participants were given eight hypothetical risks described by seven 
attributes, and were asked to rank eight hypothetical risks according to their concerns. Each 
risk was represented on a separate card. Based on previous risk-attribute studies, seven 
attributes known to be important in lay risk-rankings were selected: (1) number of expected 
deaths per year; (2) number of illnesses/injuries per year; (3) uncertainty of the estimated 
numbers; (4) quality of scientific understanding; (5) ability to control exposure; (6) the 
greatest number of deaths in a single episode; and (7) time between exposure and effect.  
We also designed a task to assess people's attitudes towards risk-mitigation programs. 
Respondents were asked to rank eight hypothetical risk-mitigation programs according to how 
valuable they thought these programs were. As in the previous task, the programs were 
represented on eight separate cards. Each program has seven attributes: (1) number of 
expected lives saved per year; (2) uncertainty of the estimated number; (3) quality of life 
improved; (4) probability that the program will not help; (5) scope of benefits; (6) fairness; 
 
 19
and (7) when the benefits are realized. Table 4 presents the design of the hypothetical multi-
attribute risks and risk-mitigation programs. Appendix 1 presents the definition of above 
attributes in risks and risk-mitigation programs. 
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_________________________________________ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
_________________________________________ 
 
Back-translation methods (Brislin, 1986) were used to create the Chinese version of the 
materials the same way as in the first experiment. This experiment was conducted after the 
first experiment. See Experiment 1 for the procedure. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Hypothetical Multi-attribute Risks  
In order to check the existence of other potential predictors, we ran a linear regression 
including gender, age, major and nation as independent variables for the relative importance 
of each attribute. No significant demographic predictors were found except a gender 
difference for the attribute of uncertainty of the estimated number of deaths, illness or 
injuries.  Female participants were less concerned with high uncertainty risks (p<0.05).  
 
_________________________________________ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
_________________________________________ 
 
As shown in Table 5, Chinese participants were concerned about all dimensions in risk 
except for the time between exposure and impact, whereas U.S. participants were concerned 
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about all dimensions except for uncertainty of the estimated number of deaths, illnesses or 
injuries and scientific understanding. When ranking concerns for hypothetical risks, Chinese 
and U.S. participants were significantly different on three dimensions: (1) uncertainty of the 
estimated number of deaths, illnesses or injuries (p < 0.01); (2) time between exposure and 
effects (p<0.05); and (3) the greatest number of deaths in a single episode (p<0.01). In other 
words, the U.S participants were somewhat more concerned about risks with higher 
uncertainty, more immediate effects after exposure, whereas Chinese participants were more 
concerned about risks that are more catastrophic.  
 
Hypothetical Multi-attribute Risk-Mitigation Programs 
Table 5 also shows that when ranking the risk-mitigation programs based on how valuable 
they are, Chinese and U.S. participants were only significantly different in the scope-of-
benefits dimension (p< 0.01) ⎯ although both nationalities preferred broader benefits, it was 
much more important for Chinese. When evaluating programs, both nationalities were 
concerned about all dimensions except for the uncertainty dimension.  
 
Within-Culture Agreement vs. Between-Culture Agreements (For both experiments) 
The within- and between-culture agreements within each task were estimated by the 
average rank order correlation between all pairs of participants for all tasks in both 
experiments. In Table 6, two patterns are observed: (1) For all tasks, Chinese participants 
exhibited higher agreements within each task. (2) For both nationalities, the lowest 
agreements existed in the tasks of ranking or pricing negative-EV lotteries, whereas the 
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highest agreements existed in the task of ranking risk-mitigation programs. See more 
discussion about this in the next section.  
 
 
_________________________________________ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
_________________________________________ 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
This study examined three issues related to individual risky decision making: (1) What 
attributes are important when assessing lotteries, hypothetical risks, and hypothetical risk-
mitigation programs; (2) What value and probability weighting functions in CPT are best fit 
for the data; (3) What heuristics are better in predicting perceived risk and subjective value 
for monetary lotteries. In this section, we discuss possible culture interpretations of our results 
and the methodology concerns.  
Culture is considered to have relatively stable and constant influences on people. Two 
cultural factors provided by Hofstede (1980) may be relevant here. One is Uncertainty 
Avoidance (UA), an index that measures the tendency to prefer stability. In Hofstede’ study, 
the United States had a score of 36, which is much lower than Asian countries (e.g., Hong 
Kong’s  score is 61, and Taiwan’s score is 73). The higher Uncertainty Avoidance scores for 
Asian countries (Hofstede, 1980) imply that variance or uncertainty are expected to have 
greater influences for Chinese participants in risk judgment and lottery valuation. The higher 
weights on catastrophic potential (i.e., the greatest number of deaths in a single episode) by 
 
 23
Chinese participants in the second experiment might reflect this tendency. However, in the 
second experiment, the U.S. participants were more concerned about the risks with higher 
uncertainty, and in the first experiment, no significant cultural differences were found for 
MAX-MIN from the heuristics analysis or for relative weights on SD from the conjoint 
analysis. Similar to probability-of-loss attribute, the attention on uncertainty of risky options 
seemed to vary across contexts. No conclusive cultural differences were observed concerning 
uncertainty attribute.  
Another index, individualism-collectivism distinction, is widely used to explain behavior 
variations in culture. In general, U.S. participants come from a more individualistic culture in 
which independence and freedom are encouraged. By contrast, confrontations are not 
encouraged in the Asian educational tradition, and people are expected to show respect to 
authorities and be harmonious with others. As a consequence, the collective vs. individualistic 
culture differences might explain the higher agreements among Chinese participants for all 
tasks. The student samples used in the current study were supposed to be more homogenous 
than a more representative national sample, so we expect the differences of agreement rates to 
be greater for larger population. In addition, the higher concern of scope of benefits by 
Chinese participants in the risk-mitigation task may also reflect their collective culture 
tradition. 
Although cross-national differences did emerge from the two experiments that we 
conducted, a more remarkable phenomenon in this study, as well as in many previous studies, 
is that individuals’ preferences are more situational-dependent. For example, the current study 
was motivated by a comparison of several simple heuristics. The correlation patterns of these 
heuristics in previous studies and in our own studies were very different at the first sight. We 
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considered that some of the differences and anomalies could be explained by the different 
designs of stimuli and task. A more careful look at the results of the heuristic analysis 
provides some convergent evidence across all cultures and all studies. For instance, the 
magnitudes of gain/loss (MAX or MIN) were important in the tasks of pricing lotteries, but 
less important in riskiness-ranking tasks. 
Regarding the CPT function assessment, we should also consider the potential impacts of 
different elicitation methods used by researchers to assess utility functions. We adopted the 
certainty equivalence method to assess utility function to make current studies comparable to 
the study by Weber and Hsee (1998), although many other assessment methods exists, such as 
probability equivalence methods and preference comparison methods (Farquhar, 1984). Every 
elicitation method has its advantages and potential sources of biases (Hershey, Kunreuther, & 
Schoemaker, 1982). Different response modes may lead respondents to attend to different 
dimensions of the lotteries, which result in systematically different risk attitudes such as 
findings documented in preference reversal studies (e.g., Tversky et al., 1990; Tversky and 
Thaler, 1990). 
The difficulty of tasks is another factor that can influence preferences. Many researchers 
have found that it is more difficult for individuals to evaluate the desirability of values on 
some attributes than others (Hsee, Lowenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999). Our study 
supports the claim that people have clearer preferences on the attributes that are more 
familiar, more salient, and less complex (Fischhoff, Welch, & Frederick, 1999). For these 
attributes, people will have stronger and more stable attitudes, which are called “basic values” 
(Fischhoff, 1991). In this study, these attributes proved to be annual deaths, annual 
injuries/illnesses, and annual lives saved. Their relative importance weights were consistently 
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higher in the expected directions. By contrast, an attribute like P(−) was not a straightforward 
predictor in the first experiment, but probability of failure in risk-mitigation programs proved 
to be important to both nationalities in the second experiment. It appears that the use of 
probability information might vary when the salience or response modes vary. The 
uncertainty or variance attribute seems to be another example of such unstable attributes. 
The views about less stable preferences in negative domains are further supported by two 
findings:(1) Both nationalities have lowest agreements for negative-EV-lottery tasks and 
highest agreements for risk-mitigation tasks; (2) The fitting of CPT functions suggests that the 
risk-averse value function are more stable in gains, but that the shape of value functions are 
far more variable in the loss domain, a result that is consistent with previous research on the 
shape of utility functions (Fennema & Assen, 1999) and framing effects (Schneider, 1992).  
The message from this study suggests that cross-cultural differences might not be as 
dramatic as we imagine. Cross-national communication and cooperation on risk-mitigation 
projects may be quite promising and feasible. A repeated theme underlying the above issues is 
that people’s judgment and choice are greatly influenced by the contexts; on the other hand, 
we tend to believe that people have some stable and basic values across context and culture. 
Before drawing any conclusions about cultural differences, we must be aware that sometimes 
the influence from researchers could be greater than cultures. As we discussed throughout this 
paper, some seemly trivial changes in stimuli, response modes, or other aspects can affect the 
preference judgment or decision-making in a dramatic way. We feel that multi-stimuli, multi-
response-mode, and multi-analytic-method studies like this one should be encouraged in the 
future to help us reach more reliable results and gain more insights about people’s value 
structures and decision rules (Weber and Hsee, 1999). 
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Table 1. Design of Lotteries in Experiment 1 
 
Lotteries used in Task 1 (EV>0) 
Lottery No. Outcome1  
($) 
Probability1      Outcome2
 ($) 
Probability2 Outcome3
 ($) 
Probability3 EV
($) 
SD 
($) 
P(-) 
A1          10.50 0.70 -18.50 0.25 -35.00 0.05 1 15 0.30
B1          33.00 0.70 -30.00 0.25 -118.00 0.05 10 40 0.30
          
C1          45.00 0.05 18.00 0.25 -8.00 0.70 1 15 0.70
D1          153.00 0.05 41.50 0.25 -11.50 0.70 10 40 0.70
          
E1          27.00 0.70 -63.00 0.25 -43.00 0.05 1 40 0.30
F1          17.50 0.70 -0.10 0.25 -46.50 0.05 10 15 0.30
          
G1          45.00 0.05 65.00 0.25 -25.00 0.70 1 40 0.70
H1          30.00 0.05 34.00 0.25 -0.10 0.70 10 15 0.70
Lotteries used in Task 2 (EV<0)  
Lottery No. Outcome1  
($) 
Probability1      Outcome2 
($) 
Probability2 Outcome3
($) 
Probability3 EV
($) 
SD 
($) 
P(-) 
A2          8.00 0.70 -17.50 0.25 -45.50 0.05 -1 15 0.30
B2          11.50 0.70 -41.50 0.25 -153.00 0.05 -10 40 0.30
          
C2          45.00 0.05 15.00 0.25 -10.00 0.70 -1 15 0.70
D2          147.50 0.05 11.00 0.25 -29.00 0.70 -10 40 0.70
          
E2          25.00 0.70 -64.00 0.25 -50.00 0.05 -1 40 0.30
F2          0.10 0.70 -34.00 0.25 -31.00 0.05 -10 15 0.30
          
G2          50.00 0.05 62.00 0.25 -27.00 0.70 -1 40 0.70
H2          28.00 0.05 9.00 0.25 -19.50 0.70 -10 15 0.70
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Table 2. Correlation of simple heuristics with Rank(riskiness) and WTP 
              
   Algorithms Heuristics
    EV MAX MAX−MINMIN P(−) 
China -0.70*     -0.21 -0.46* 0.27 0.26Bentempo et al., 1997 
US      -0.68* -0.04 -0.46* 0.36* 0.35*
China     0.70* 0.78* -0.39 0.76* 0.15aWeber & Hsee, 1998 
US     0.47 0.86* 0.12 0.51* 0.62*b
China      -0.66* -0.19 -0.69* 0.36 -0.44Current Study EV>0 
US      -0.29 0.10 -0.71* 0.78* -0.33
China      -0.60* -0.19 -0.40 0.18 -0.22
Correlation between 
Rank(Riskiness) 
and  
Rank (heuristics) 
Current Study EV<0 
US      -0.48 0.38 -0.19 0.59* 0.22
China      0.92* 0.89* -0.28 0.86* 0.22Weber & Hsee, 1998 
US      0.91* 0.91* -0.28 0.88* 0.29
China      0.46* 0.60* 0.83* -0.14 0.70*
Correlation between 
WTP and heuristics 
Current Study 
US      0.20 0.45* 0.92* -0.35 0.79*
 
* Significant different from zero at 0.05 level.  
a Values identified by different superscripts are significantly different from each other at the .05 level. 
Note:  
1. The Chinese group in Bentempo et al., 1997 is the combination of all subjects from Hong Kong and Taiwan in Bentempo et al. 1997. 
2. Lower rank of riskiness corresponding to lower riskiness; lower rank of other values corresponding to lower values. 
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Table 3. Conjoint analysis for Experiment 1 
 
 
 Attributes of  Riskiness Ranking  Attributes of WTP Ranking 
Lottery EV> 0 EV    SD P(−) EV SD P(−) 
China  -4.9*a 5.1*    -4.4* 4.9* -2.8* 7.7*
U.S.  -2.2*b 6.4*    -3.0 2.6* -5.3* 4.4*
Lottery EV<0 EV    SD P(−) EV SD P(−) 
China  -6.3*a 2.3*    -1.7 4.8* 1.1 3.7*
U.S.  -3.8*b 3.1*    1.2 3.0* -1.8* 3.3
Hypothesized direction − +   + + − − 
 
* Significant different from zero at 0.05 level 
a Values identified by different superscripts are significantly different from each other at the .05 level. 
Note:  
1.For each attribute, the difference between sum of ranks of high level and of low level was calculated. One sample t test was used to test whether the difference is significant. 
2.Two-sample t test was used to test whether the cross-nation within task differences was significant.  
3. Lower rank of riskiness corresponding to lower riskiness; lower rank of other vaues corresponding to lower values. 
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Table 4. Conjoint design for Experiment 2 
 
Hypothetical Risks A        B C D E F G H
Number of expected deaths per year                                                               −: 0.5               +: 5 − + − + + − + − 
Illness/injury per year                                                                                       −: 20             +: 2000 +    + − − − − + +
Uncertainty  of the estimated number of deaths,  illnesses or injuries 
                            low estimate       (best estimate)       high  estimate                                     low estimate       (best estimate)     high 
estimate 
−: low uncertainty   (deaths )    0.4             (0.5)                0.6                   +: high  uncertainty  (deaths)    0.01             ( 0.5)                     2   
                                                4                  (5)                   6                                                                         0.1                (5)                      20       
                   (illness/injury)     18               (20 )               22                                        (illness/injury)        5                (20) 
100 
                                            1800            (2000)            2200                                                                       500            ( 2000)                10000 
− − − − + + + + 
Quality of scientific understanding                                    −: low                              +: high + + − − + + − − 
Ability to control exposure                                                 −: no control                  +: voluntary + − − + + − − + 
The greatest number of deaths in a single episode                         −: 5                                  +: 500 + − + − + − + − 
Time between exposure and the effects ( deaths, injuries or illnesses) 
−: immediately               +: many years 
+ − − + − + + − 
 
Hypothetical Risk-mitigation Programs A B C D    E F G H 
Number of expected lives saved per year                                −: 1                       +: 10 − + − + + − + − 
Uncertainty of the estimated number of expected lives saved per year 
                     low estimate      (best estimate)       high  estimate                                    low estimate         (best estimate)        high estimate 
−: low uncertainty              0.9             (1)                 1.1             +: high uncertainty:             0.1                   (1)                     3 
                                           9              (10)                 11                                                            1                   (10 )                   30  
+    + − − − − + +
Quality of life improved                                                         −: little                   +: greatly − − − − + + + + 
Probability that the program will  not help                             −: 1%                    +: 20% + + − − + + − − 
Scope of  benefit                                                             −:narrow benefit           +:broad benefit + − − + + − − + 
Fairness 
−: the program does not benefit those people who contribute or sacrifice  
+: the program benefit  those people who contribute or  sacrifice  
+ − + − + − + − 
When the benefits are realized                                           −: this generation      +: next generation + − − + − + + − 
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Table 5. Conjoint analyses for experiment 2 
 
Attributes of Hypothetical 
Risks 
Deaths 
 
Illnesses/Injuries 
 
Uncertainty   Scientific
understanding  
Control Greatest number of
deaths in a single 
episode 
  Time between 
exposure and effect  
China     5.8* 2.8* -2.2*a 0.7* -5.1* 8.0*a -0.8a
U.S.     3.8* 4.0* 1.1b 0.2 -4.3* 2.1*b -4.2*b
Attributes of Risk-
Reduction Programs 
Lives saved Uncertainty Life quality Probability of failure Scope of Benefit  Fairness When benefits are 
realized 
China 5.0*      -0.3 6.8* -3.5* 6.7*a 2.8* -3.4*
U.S.       7.2* -0.3 6.6* -3.7* 1.7*b 2.2* -2.8*
 
* Significant different from zero at 0.05 level 
a Values identified by different superscripts are significantly different from each other at the .05 level. 
Note:  
1.For each attribute, the difference between sum of ranks of high level and of low level was calculated. One sample t test was used to test whether the difference is significant. 
2.Two-sample t test was used to test whether the cross-nation within task differences was significant.  
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Table 6. Within-culture agreement vs. between-culture agreement 
 
 
 
Lottery Rank(riskiness) Lottery WTPs 
 
EV>0    EV<0 EV>0 EV<0
Hypothetical 
Risks 
Risk-mitigation 
Programs 
China     0.26 0.14 0.30 0.12 0.39 0.42
US    0.19 0.06 0.19 0.05 0.19 0.35
Between US and China 0.28 0.10 0.24 0.12 0.18 0.34 
Average 
correlation 
All Participants 0.22 0.10 0.24 0.09 0.26 0.37 
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Figure 1. Risk-aversion coefficient for both nationalities in gains and losses 
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Figure 2 Parameter estimates in weighting function in gains and losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a. cdf for parameters in probability weighting function in 
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Figure 3. Individual Risk Coefficient in CPT value function for Gains and Losses 
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Appendix 1. The Definition of Each Attribute in risk-ranking and risk-mitigation 
programs  
 
Part III. Risk Ranking  Imagine that you are living in a small city with a population of 100,000 
people. Everyday, you and your community face various health and safety risks, from traffic 
accidents to air pollution.  We want to know which risks concern you the most. 
 
In this envelope, you will find 8 cards --- each describing a risk that you and your community are 
exposed to.  These risks are only labeled by letters (A through H) and are described using six 
attributes, defined as follows:. 
 
Number of expected deaths per year. This is the average number of deaths per year in the 
community as a result of exposure to this risk, whether the deaths occur now or years in the 
future. Due to uncertainty, best estimates, low estimates, and high estimates are given.   
 
Number of illness or injury cases per year. This is the average number of illnesses or 
injuries that occur per year in your community as a result of exposure to this risk. Due to 
uncertainty, best estimates, low estimates, and high estimates are given. 
 
Quality of scientific understanding. This measure describes how well scientists know the 
relationship between a risk and its resulting health impacts. For instance, for many cancers, 
scientists do not know how exposure leads to a particular disease, but scientists do 
understand how automobile accidents cause injuries. Two categories are used to rate 
scientific understanding: “low” and “high.” 
 
Ability to control exposure. For some risks, exposure is beyond your control (for 
example, air pollution – you have to breathe), but for other risks, exposure maybe 
voluntary (for example, swimming or motorcycle riding – you choose to participate). Two 
categories are used to describe the level of control: “no control” and “voluntary.” 
 
Greatest number of deaths in a single episode.   Some of the risks in your community 
can  only affect a few people at a time, while other risks can affect a large group of people 
all at once. For instance, falling down a flight of stairs could only hurt at most one person, 
but an airplane crash could claim hundreds of lives at once.  
 
Time between exposure and effects (deaths, illness or injury). Some risks, such as 
accidents, have immediate impacts, while other risks such as chemical pollution may not 
effect people until many years into the future. 
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Part IV. Risk-mitigation Program Ranking  Imagine that you are living in a small city with a 
population of 100,000 people. Everyday, you and your community face various health and safety 
risks, from traffic accidents to air pollution. The government has proposed 8 different programs 
to reduce or control these risks. Assume that each costs the same to implement. 
 
In this envelope, you will find 8 cards -- each describing a proposed risk-reduction program. 
These programs are labeled by letters (A through H) and are described using six attributes, 
defined as follows:. 
 
Number of expected lives saved per year.  This is the average number of lives that the 
program is expected to save each year. Due to uncertainty, best estimates, low estimates, 
and high estimates are given. 
 
Quality of life improvement.  In addition to saving lives, some programs improve the 
general quality of life for the community (for instance, better recreation or park space, 
more educational facilities and libraries). Two categories are used to rate improved quality 
of life: “little” and “greatly.” 
 
Probability that the program will not help.  Though all programs are expected to reduce 
risks, some programs may not be successful (for example, finding new highly efficient 
energy resources), while other programs are almost guaranteed to work at some level (for 
example, recycling the waste). 
 
Scope of benefits. Some programs help many people in the community while others are 
focused on a smaller group (for example, only old people). Two categories are used: “broad 
benefits” and “narrow benefits.” 
 
Fairness. For some programs, the people who contribute or sacrifice directly benefit from 
the program, while for other programs, the people sacrificing are not the ones that benefit 
(for example, families are forced to moved because of a new highway project).  
 
When the benefits are realized. For some programs, the benefits are not realized until the 
next generation (for instance, saving natural resources), while for other programs benefits 
are realized by this generation (for instance, reducing traffic accidents). 
 
 
 
